ODPM and CLG lauded the Value Improvement Projects or VIP as models of best practise. In simple terms, central government gave monies to individual authorities to develop (claimed) best practise that other authorities in SP should follow.

Cornwall was a case in point with their best practise model of procuring floating support services. Infamously, this led to one organisation being awarded a large scale FS contract – a model adopted elsewhere with undue haste despite the obvious risks this entailed for all concerned. The Cornwall Model has failed miserably less than a year into this experiment.

Cornwall’s published Commissioning Body (CB) minutes reveal major concerns were evident in June 2007 just 3 months after contract began in April 2007. A communication statement from Cornwall County Council I have witnessed reveals than service failed a review in August 2007. Also, that the provider terminated parts of the contract in December 2007 and that the provider gave notice to terminate the rest of the contract two weeks ago.

This contract was the one reported to have seen the ‘provider’ organisation (and I use that term loosely) win the contract based on circa £13.60 per hour and then offer other providers, from whom they had taken the contract, about £10.00 per hour to continue. Clearly, the fact that the official national figure of FS of £23.08 per hour seems to have played no part in the initial decision-making process is an issue here. Do you get what you pay for?

Cornwall heralded the massive (potential) savings at the time to them with their published best practise project brief stating the risk of provider failure of such a contract to be low. This is clearly not the case as events have unfolded. The self-evident risks in awarding large scale FS contracts – the basis of the Cornwall Model – have come home to roost. The re -tendering process that Cornwall now has to embark upon will have wiped out the alleged potential savings of the Cornwall Model. Indeed it appears likely that new costs will be more than the claimed savings in the first place, just in financial terms.

Yet this process that has been replicated elsewhere, has seen support staff being TUPE’d twice in less than a year and the new re-tendering will mean they will be TUPE’d again - for the third time - within the first year. What impact doe this have on service delivery, morale and service quality are questions that spring to mind? How could any AA be convinced of provider quality in April and then have serious concerns just 3 months later? There are many more serious questions about the judgements made by Cornwall here.

However, what is the impact here on CLG? They champion the Cornwall model as best practise. That model has been replicated in many areas by other AAs, as was its intention. Will the CLG now issue guidance to all AAs not to follow this model? Will they even circulate a letter to all AAs to urge them to seek caution in following such a model? I doubt it. Yet we all noted CLG taking praise for developing this claimed ‘best practise’ model when it was launched – a fair weather ‘friend’ to authorities perhaps?

Many at the time raised these risks and predicted that such a model was bound to fail, myself included. The adoption of FS as a universal panacea and the rush to make (alleged) savings were clearly self-evident in the Cornwall Model ….irrespective of the consequences.

Yet consequences to whom? Service users have undoubtedly suffered due to this farce. Support staff clearly have. Providers who lost this contract inevitably will have taken years of experience and specialist knowledge away from service provision in Cornwall. But, here we have a council that is funded and lauded by central government in developing a ‘model’ that was supported by (so-called) leading academia in this area. The council has clearly messed up here, but what council officials are ever going to be sacked say, for awarding a contract with such an audit trail and such backing? None!

This sorry episode exposes the rush for savings by councils to be no risk whatsoever to individual decision-makers within councils or to councils corporately. It does expose that even highly regarded academia and CLG and the best efforts of Cornwall SP and CB has failed to grasp the complexities and individualities inherent within supported housing, inherent by its nature – all in the pursuit of ‘savings.’ Authorities that rush into such models which all are based on the ridiculous notion that support – whether floating or accommodation-based – can be generic, or large parts of it can be ‘generic’ are treading dangerous ground. Yet while these self-evident risks and deluded theory carry little if any risk to authorities and no sanction why would these cease?

Whilst AAs continue to see and treat vulnerable people as units; while they retain deluded notions that support can be generic or largely generic; while they rigidly seek savings, savings, savings as some form of mantra; and while they have no accountability or sanction, then such high-risk, narrow-minded and frankly offensive policies will continue.

Or in simple terms, decision makers in local and central government will continue to get away with experimenting with the lives of vulnerable people and have the audacity to claim this is in the best interests of the public purse. But because they are at least one step away from dealing directly with such vulnerable people this wont get called what is it, and that is abuse borne out of too much control and too many conflicts of interest coming home to roost.

Back before SP began concerns were raised over transferring a demand led benefit into a cash limited pot. Accountability was needed was the argument for the good of the public purse. Little of the argument focused upon the transfer of 'control' that authorities now have to commission or buy services yet clearly not having the expertise to know what they are buying or even want to buy. In this 'model' it was deemed a low risk that "The resulting model for floating support fails to address the identified business needs" and a low risk that "Service Providers fail to deliver services to the required standard" And low risk that "The Project gets service delivery model wrong resulting in a decline in service standards" And finally low risk that Little or no project methodology experience within the authority" will have an impact.

If commissioners dont know what is possible to achieve then how can they commission at all?