April 2004

May 25, 2004 in Community Care

Butterworths Family and Child Law Bulletin – April
2004

Bulletin Editor
Jonathan Montgomery, BA, LLM
Professor of Law, University of Southampton

Butterworths Family and Child Law Bulletin provides an immediate
updating service for the main text of Butterworths Family Law
Service and Clarke Hall and Morrison on Children. The Bulletin is
published every month and sent to subscribers to those
publications.
References to BFLS and CHM above each case are to the relevant
paragraphs in Butterworths Family Law Service and Clarke Hall and
Morrison on Children.

Domestic violence

Sentencing guidelines—concurrent Family Law Act 1996 and
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 proceedings

Lomas v Parle [2003] EWCA Civ 1804, [2004] 1 FCR 97

BFLS 1A[3501], [4034]; CHM 5[252]

In Lomas v Parle [2003] EWCA Civ 1804, [2004] 1 FCR 97, a wife
appealed against a sentence of imprisonment imposed on her husband
for breach of injunctions granted under s 42 of the Family Law Act
1996, seeking to increase its length. The Court of Appeal was
required to consider whether the sentence was ‘unduly
lenient’, not merely whether it would itself have imposed a
harsher sentence (adopting the approach taken in criminal cases
when the Attorney General seeks to appeal against sentence, see
Neil v Ryan [1991] 1 FCR 241). The Court of Appeal found that the
sentences of four months to run concurrently were unduly lenient
for a case with such an appalling history. This was the third
sentence for contempt in relation to violence against the woman and
the man had flouted the court orders and seized any leniency as an
opportunity to resume his campaign against the wife. The judge
seemed to have contradicted himself, noting initially that the
man’s claim to have reformed was not credible in light of the
history of the case, but then explaining the sentence as being
premised on the fact that he had changed his life. The breaches in
question were very sinister (death threats) and presented in a very
unpleasant way (razor blades through the post accompanied by
threats). The Court of Appeal regarded a sentence of less than 10
months’ imprisonment as unduly lenient, but in fact fixed a
lesser sentence of eight months to reflect the degree of double
jeopardy due to sentences passed against him in prosecutions under
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for behaviour directed
against the wife.

Comment: The clarification of the role of the court in an appeal
to increase a sentence for contempt of court in a domestic violence
case is helpful, but its substance was to be expected. Such appeals
are automatic and do not require permission, but they will only
succeed if the sentence is significantly shorter than would have
been expected. Perhaps of more importance is the guidance given by
the Court of Appeal on the interaction between the Family Law Act
1996 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Attention was
drawn to reasons for choosing one remedy rather than the other. One
such factor is that s 3(3) of the 1997 Act requires a separate
application for a warrant of arrest once breach occurs, while a
power of arrest may be attached to a non-molestation injunction
under s 42 of the 1996 Act when it is made. However, as counsel
pointed out, the combined effect of the maximum five year sentence
for breach of a civil injunction imposed by s 3(6) of the 1997 Act
and general police powers do in fact make such a breach an
arrestable offence even without a warrant (see para [24] of the
court’s judgments). Other factors for selecting a remedy
include the fact that the victim has little control in criminal
proceedings and this may prompt use of the 1996 Act rather than the
Protection from Harassment procedure. It is also possible to use
both Acts concurrently in order to take advantage of the scope for
compensation under s 3(2) of the 1997 Act, and if this happens the
proceedings should be consolidated (para [44]). In relation to
sentencing where there are proceedings under both Acts in relation
to the same conduct, the first court should not seek to anticipate
the sentence in the other proceedings. Instead, the second court
should take the previous sentence into account to ensure that the
defendant is not punished twice for the same offence and should
therefore be fully informed of the earlier proceedings. In general
terms, however, judges should seek to ensure that there was no
manifest discrepancy between sentences under the two Acts.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction where foreign court has reserved jurisdiction to
itself

Re D [2003] EWH 565 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 1159 (FD)

BFLS 5A[127]

In Re D [2003] EWHC 565 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 1159 (FD) Bracewell
J found that she should respect the jurisdiction of the court in
Virginia, USA, in a contact case concerning a child now resident in
the UK. The child had been brought to England with the permission
of the American court, which had reserved jurisdiction to itself.
While it would not be possible for such a reservation to determine
jurisdiction in perpetuity, in a case where the foreign court had a
great deal of information available to it and where it had
exercised jurisdiction as recently as six months previously the
issue would be concluded more speedily by that court than by the
English court taking on the case. While habitual residence was a
very important factor in cases involving children, it was not
conclusive. In this case Virginia was the proper forum for the
case. The mother’s application for a declaration that the
English court had primary jurisdiction was refused. A stay of the
English proceedings was issued.

Comment: While the normal basis for jurisdiction is habitual
residence, there were clear reasons for respecting the continuing
jurisdiction of the court in this case. The child had already been
resident in England at the time of the previous hearing in Virginia
and the wife’s counsel could have raised the jurisdictional
issue at that point. The only significant development since that
time was that the mother had decided that she no longer wanted to
comply with the order of the court. Having willingly submitted to
the jurisdiction of the US court six months previously, she should
not be permitted to seek to litigate in England merely because she
felt that forum could be more sympathetic to her case.

Taxation

(Notes contributed by Philip Wylie, tax editor of the
service)

The following is a summary of the principal changes affecting
taxation of the family which were either announced or confirmed in
the Budget on 17 March 2004.

Income Tax

Rates for 2003/04 and 2004/05:

2003/04
starting rate 10% on the first £1,960 of taxable income
basic rate 22% on taxable income from £1,961 to
£30,500
higher rate 40% on taxable income over £30,500

2004/05
starting rate 10% on the first £2,020 of taxable income
basic rate 22% on taxable income from £2,021 to
£31,400
higher rate 40% on taxable income over £31,400

The rate of tax on dividend income plus the related tax credit
is 10% for a taxpayer who is not liable to higher rate income tax,
and 32.5% for a taxpayer who is. The rate of tax on certain other
savings income, mainly interest, is 10% if the income is wholly
within the starting rate band, 20% (rather than 22%) if the income
is within the basic rate band, and 40% for a taxpayer who is liable
to higher rate income tax.

For 2004/05 the trust rate of tax, payable mainly by
discretionary and accumulation trusts, is increased to 40% (34% for
2003/04), and the Schedule F (dividends) trust rate is increased to
32.5% (25% for 2003/04).

Personal reliefs for 2004/05 (2003/04 reliefs in
brackets)

personal allowance
under 65 £4,745 (£4,615)
65–74 £6,830 (£6,610)
75+ £6,950 (£6,720)

married couple’s allowance for those over 65 before 6
April 2000 (restricted to tax relief at 10%)
65–74 £5,725 (£5,565)
75+ £5,795 (£5,635)
minimum allowance £2,210 (£2,150)

The personal and married couple’s allowance for the over
65s are reduced by one half of excess of total income over
£18,900 (£18,300 in 2003/04), but they can never be
reduced below the ordinary personal allowance or the minimum
married couple’s allowance.
blind person’s allowance has been increased from £1,510
to £1,560.

Maintenance payments

For those few maintenance payments which continue to qualify for
income tax relief (a pre-condition is that one spouse must have
been over 65 before 6 April 2000), the maximum amount on which a
10% tax credit can be claimed is £2,210 (£2,150 in
2003/04).

WTC and CTC

The working tax credit and child tax credit rates and thresholds
for 2003/04 and 2004/05 are:

2003/04/2004/05
Working Tax Credit
Basic element  £1,525 £1,570
Couple and lone parent element £1,500 £1,545
30 hour element £620 £640
Disabled worker element £2,040 £2,100
Severe disability element £865 £890
50+ return to work payment (16–29
hours) £1,045 £1,075
50+ return to work payment (30+
hours) £1,565 £1,610
Childcare element of the Working Tax Credit
Maximum eligible cost for one child per
week £135 £135
£200 £200
% of eligible childcare costs covered 70% 70%
Child Tax Credit
Family element £545 £545
Family element, baby addition £545 £545
Child element £1,445 £1,625
Disabled child element £2,155 £2,215
Severely disabled child element £865 £890
Tax credits income thresholds and withdrawal rates
First income threshold £5,060 £5,060
First withdrawal rate (per cent) 37% 37%
Second income threshold 50,000 £50,000
Second withdrawal rate (per cent) 6.67% 6.67%
First threshold for those only entitled to
CTC £13,230 £13,480
Income disregard £2,500 £2,500

Income-producing assets

Under ICTA 1988 s282 if a married couple have joint legal
ownership of income producing assets, each spouse is taxed on half
the income, even if the beneficial ownership of the income is
unequal.

However, the couple may elect to be taxed on the income to which
each is beneficially entitled. From 2004/05, for distributions from
jointly owned shares in close companies only, the automatic 50:50
split will no longer apply. Instead each spouse will be taxed on
that spouse’s beneficial entitlement to the income. Close
companies are broadly companies which are owned and run by five or
fewer people.

Corporation tax

The Budget proposes a minimum rate of corporation tax of 19% on
company distributions to non-corporate shareholders. The starting
rate for corporation tax is 0% if profits do not exceed
£10,000, and the effect of marginal relief is that the small
companies’ rate of 19% on total profits is not reached until
profits are over £50,000. For distributions made on or after 1
April 2004 there will be a minimum rate of corporation tax of 19%
on an amount of profits equal to the distribution. The new rule
will therefore affect a company with taxable profits of up to
£50,000. The higher charge will not apply if profits are
retained in the company.

Capital gains tax

For 2004/05 the annual exemption is increased from £7,900
to £8,200. The CGT rates remain unaltered at 10%, 20%, and
40%.

Inheritance tax

The inheritance tax threshold is increased from £255,000 to
£263,000 for tax charges arising on or after 6 April 2004.

From 6 April 2005 there will be an income tax charge on a donor
who has given away an asset (or provided funds to purchase it), but
who continues to derive enjoyment from the asset. The intention is
that an annual value should be determined for the use of the asset,
and that annual value will constitute additional taxable income.
The new rules will apply to assets disposed of before 6 April 2005
if there is continued enjoyment of them on or after that date. It
has been announced that the new rules will not apply to the extent
that:
— the property in question ceased to be owned before 18 March
1986;
— property formerly owned by a taxpayer is currently owned by
his spouse;
— the asset in question still counts as part of the
taxpayer’s estate for inheritance tax purposes under the
‘gift with reservation’ rules;
— the property was sold by the taxpayer at an arm’s
length price, paid in cash (whether or not the sale is to a
connected party); or
— the enjoyment of the property is no more than incidental,
including cases where an out-and-out gift to a family member comes
to benefit the donor following a change in their circumstances.

Stamp Duty and Stamp Duty Land Tax

The main rates and thresholds of stamp duty and SDLT as they
affect individuals remain unchanged.

Child protection

Publication of child protection inquiry

Local Authority v Health Authority (disclosure: restriction on
publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] 1 FCR 113, [2004] 1 All
ER 480, [2004] 1 FLR 541 (FD)

CHM 1[1395]

In Local Authority v Health Authority (disclosure: restriction
on publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] 1 FCR 113, [2004] 1
All ER 480, [2004] 1 FLR 541 (FD) a dispute arose over the
publication of a ‘Part 8’ review into the care given by
a foster mother. In fact, as the inquiry considered the position of
vulnerable adults in the woman’s care as well as children, it
was wrong to describe it as a review under Part 8 of Working
Together, which was guidance under the Children Act 1989. The local
authority wished to publish the first part of the report, which is
the normal practice in relation to Part 8 reviews. The second part
of the report was confidential to the agencies involved and
contained detailed accounts of individual cases. The health
authority, which had disclosed records to the inquiry, objected to
publication on the basis that the report had been insufficiently
anonymised. The foster mother, and the Official Solicitor on behalf
of the children and some of the vulnerable adults involved, also
sought to prevent publication of the first part of the report on
the basis that the individuals concerned would be readily
identified from the information that it contained. They contended
that this would breach their rights under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The local authority applied for an
order under the inherent jurisdiction of the court for permission
to publish the report, arguing that the main aim was to publicise
the lessons to be learnt and relying on Article 10 of the ECHR
(freedom of expression).

The first issue concerned the power of the local authority to
establish an inquiry that went beyond the parameters of a Part 8
review. Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P held that the authority did have
the power to do so under the Local Government Act 1972. Although
the process had been misleadingly described as being carried out
under Part 8 of Working Together, this did not invalidate the basis
of the inquiry and the terms of reference had made it clear that it
extended beyond the issues relating to the children. Nor was it
ultra vires the authority’s functions.

A second matter concerned the jurisdiction of the court. The
local authority conceded this jurisdiction over 5% of the report,
which was based on health information disclosed to the inquiry
under court orders previously made by Hughes J and Munby J.
However, it suggested that it was only in respect of this material
that the court could exercise supervisory powers under the inherent
jurisdiction. The President accepted that the court’s
inherent jurisdiction could only be used to protect the interests
of those under a disability. Consequently, it could not be
exercised to protect the interests of the foster mother, the
adoption agency that had been involved, or the health authority.
Nor could the law of confidentiality be extended to cover the
foster mother, although it was noted that not all of the arguably
relevant lines of judicial authority had been canvassed before the
court. The court did have jurisdiction to safeguard the interests
of the children involved. Under this ‘protective’
exercise of the jurisdiction (following the classification set out
by Munby J in Kelly v BBC [2000] 3 FCR 509, 530 and adopted by Hale
LJ in Re S [2003] EWCA Civ 963, [2003] 2 FCR 577 at [14]) the
interests of the children had to be balanced against freedom of
expression. It was to be presumed that the local authority should
be permitted to publish unless that would be so disadvantageous to
the child that the court was driven to restrain publication (see
para [79]). Butler-Sloss P took the review that publication would
lead to a huge amount of media interest, providing headlines for
the tabloid press dwelling on ‘the more sensational and
colourful passages’. The home in question would be readily
identifiable from the information contained in the report and this
would lead to intrusive and distressing scrutiny of those currently
living there. The balance was thereby tipped against publication of
the report.

Jurisdiction in relation to protection for vulnerable adults is
less clearly established in the case law. The President noted that
the most common use of the inherent jurisdiction in relation to
such persons was to make declarations as to the legality of medical
treatment, but she held that it was not limited to such
circumstances. Until legislation was passed dealing with these
issues, the courts could properly use the inherent jurisdiction to
plug the gap in protection for adults who were under a permanent
disability. This had already been seen in relation to questions of
residence (Re S [1995] 1 All ER 449; Re F [2000] 3 FCR 30) and
contact (Re C [1993] 1 FLR 940, although this last authority was
not specifically identified by the President as being what she had
in mind). Butler-Sloss P held that she was able to exercise a
‘protective’ inherent jurisdiction to restrain
publication of the report in the same way as she could in relation
to children. The degree of disruption in their lives that could be
anticipated if the report were published meant that their rights
under article 8 of the ECHR were engaged. Publication would be
damaging to their welfare. Even bearing in mind the importance
attached to freedom of expression under art 10 of the ECHR and
section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the balance came down
against publication of the report.

The court then turned to consider the appropriate orders to be
made. In respect of the children, there was precedent for the
making of an order restraining publication. The injunctions were
continued against disclosure of the material released to the
inquiry after the court applications before Hughes J and Munby J.
In relation to the adults, the established remedy was a declaration
(F v W Berkshire HA [1989] 2 All ER 543). Such a declaration was
made, but would not of itself bind the local authority not to
publish. An injunction restraining publication was therefore also
made. This had been done on an interlocutory basis in Re S [1995] 1
All ER 449 to preserve the status quo and the Court of Appeal
decision in that case did not indicate that there had been any
concern over this procedure.

Comment: The most significant legal ruling in this case is
probably that concerning the scope of the inherent jurisdiction to
protect vulnerable adults. The President cited the reliance of
Thorpe LJ in Re F [2000] 3 FCR 30, 45, on comments of Lord Goff in
the leading case on treatment of adults without consent (F v W
Berkshire HA). Lord Goff had envisaged the need for the common law
doctrine of necessity to extend beyond emergency life sustaining
treatment in order to accommodate the situation where a patient was
permanently incapacitated. Thorpe LJ previously and Butler-Sloss P
in the present case relied on that observation to justify a general
supervisory jurisdiction inherent in the court. This is vulnerable
to two objections. First, Lord Goff was speaking of the powers of
doctors to treat their incapacitated patients rather than the
jurisdiction of the court. When he came to consider the
jurisdiction of the court he found that there was only a
declaratory jurisdiction, not one based on parens patriae. Second,
subsequent cases have needed to justify the use of the inherent
jurisdiction by reference to established legal rights—such as
physical integrity and the right to associate—rather than a
general supervisory jurisdiction . It may be that the expansive
account given of the scope of the right to respect for private and
family life under Article 8 of the ECHR provides a satisfactory
basis for a rights based model for intervention. If it does so,
then it seems possible that the courts will effectively be able to
recreate the parens patriae jurisdiction despite its lapse in 1959.
This development would be consistent with the approach taken by
Munby J in Re S [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 292.

A further important aspect of this case was the adverse view
that the judge took of the quality of the report itself. She noted
the ‘emotive rather than factual’ tone of the report
(para [82]). She indicated that she was not satisfied that this
‘sensational story’ needed to be told in order to
support the worthy recommendations that had been made. She
indicated surprise that a short executive summary had not been
possible. In her view it had strayed far beyond the balanced
guidance given in Part 8. The poor quality of the report may have
served to tip the balance against publication. Perhaps if the
language used in the report had been more restrained, then the
court would have felt that the balance fell in favour of
publication.

Adoption

Child freed for adoption despite late identification of possible
carers within family

Re M (a child) (adoption) [2003] EWCA Civ 1874, [2004] 1 FCR
157

BFLS 3A[3147]; CHM 3[253]

Re M (a child) (adoption) [2003] EWCA Civ 1874, [2004] 1 FCR 157
concerned a case in which the local authority had placed the child
with foster parents within three months of his birth and after six
months planned to seek a order freeing him for adoption having
ascertained that there was no-one within the family willing to be
assessed as potential carers. Six months later, cousins of the
father came forward for consideration as potential carers. The
local authority and the guardian felt that this offer had come too
late and that it would be wrong to uproot the child from the only
family that he had known. The local authority sought a care order
and an order freeing him for adoption. The father sought to have
the proceedings adjourned. Ward LJ noted that the two applications
had to be considered separately. The care order should be
determined first (Re O [1999] 2 FCR 262, Re D [1999] 3 FCR 70).
Only if a care order was appropriate would it make sense to go on
to consider the freeing application. The judge, however, had failed
to make this separation. He had granted the father’s
application for adjournments because he felt that it would not have
been possible to dispense with his agreement to adoption as his
wish to explore the possibility of family care was reasonable. The
proper course would have been to have considered the care order
application first. The failure to do so led to the local
authority’s appeal against the adjournment being allowed. The
Court of Appeal considered that the child’s interests would
not be furthered by an adjournment. No further evidence was likely
to emerge that would alter the assessment that, even though the
father’s cousins were admirable, the boy would be best served
by remaining with the foster parents permanently. The father had no
prospect of offering his son a home. As Ward LJ put it, ‘if
ever… an adoption had a prospect of success, this adoption is
it.’ Consequently, the application to adjourn the care
proceedings should be dismissed and a care order made. The Court of
Appeal then went on to consider the freeing application. A single
paragraph records the reasoning that the father was unreasonably
withholding his consent as the advantages of adoption for the
welfare of the child were overwhelmingly strong enough to justify
overriding the views and interests of the father. It was not open
to the court to find that the father was reasonable simply because
he was personally blameless and was prevented from caring for the
boy by a serious mental illness.

Comment: While this decision appears to be the best outcome in
the interests of the boy in question, its reasoning seems unsound.
The Court of Appeal criticised the judge for confusing the care and
adoption proceedings by considering the prospects of dispensing
with the father’s consent to the adoption as the key to both
applications for adjournment. Yet the reason given by the Court of
Appeal for refusing to adjourn the care proceedings was that the
adoption had a high probability of success and the boy should
therefore stay where he was (see para [35]). This displays the same
conflation of the immediate and longer term issues that was seen in
the county court judgment. This case also shows how the judicial
reformulation of the test for dispensing with parental agreement to
adoption as one of whether the benefits to the child are so strong
as to justify overriding a refusal has taken the law a long way
away from the statutory wording of ‘unreasonableness’
on the part of the parent. The father had understandable reasons
for his resistance to adoption pending the assessment of the care
that could be given by his cousin with which many would sympathise.
The essence of the court’s rejection of this approach was
that his position, while understandable was not the best outcome
for the child.

Child support

Child Support Act survives Human Rights challenge

R (Kehoe) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] EWCA
Civ 225, [2004] 1 FCR 511

BFLS 4A[391], CHM 4[94]

In R (Kehoe) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004]
EWCA Civ 225, [2004] 1 FCR 511, the Court of Appeal upheld the High
Court decision that the Child Support Act 1991 was compatible with
the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the majority went
further and rejected the suggestion in Wall J in the High Court
that rights under Article 6 of the Convention were engaged (see
[2003] EWHC 1021 (Admin), [2003] 3 FCR 481). In his view (and that
of Ward LJ in a minority in the Court of Appeal) these rights were
satisfied by judicial oversight of the system through rights of
appeal, although judicial review would not have been sufficient.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found that Article 6 was only
engaged where there were legal rights that were barred from
vindication before the courts. There were no rights to maintenance
outside of the Child Support Act scheme, so there were no prior
legal rights that were being obstructed. Any rights only came into
being as part of the Child Support Act scheme. Consequently, the
claimant had no right exercisable against the father entitling her
to participate in the assessment or enforcement process.

Comment: The Court of Appeal clearly found the analysis of the
connection between the Child Support Act 1991 and rights under
Article 6 of the ECHR difficult, but all three judges agreed that
the claimant could not sustain her challenge to the legislation.
Ward LJ reached this conclusion by finding that even though Article
6 was engaged, the limitations on access to the court were
justified as a proportional step towards a legitimate aim, which
was to improve the child support system. While this decision
contains some interesting discussion about the nature of rights in
respect of administrative systems, it lends little support to the
view that the Child Support Act 1991 is significantly vulnerable to
human rights challenges.

Financial provision

Financial incentive to encourage religious divorce

A v T (2004) Times, 2 March, FD

BFLS 4A[2127.2]

In A v T (2004) Times, 2 March, FD Baron J made a lump sum order
for the wife of £35,000 in ancillary relief proceedings, with
additionally a conditional order for an order of £65,000 if
the husband failed to grant the wife a talaq divorce within a
specified time. The two predominant factors were that the marriage
had lasted only seven weeks, and the cultural context. The court
had to take into account the pre-marital agreement, which settled a
substantial sum of money on the wife. It also had to consider how
the Iranian courts would have dealt with the matter. If the husband
were to divorce the wife by talaq or to refuse to divorce her, then
under Sharia law she would be entitled to retain her marriage
portion. However, if the wife wanted a khula divorce, she would
need to negotiate what portion of her marriage portion she would
sacrifice in order to obtain it. In this context Baron J was
satisfied that her order would be equitable.

Comment: It is not clear from the brief Times report whether
Baron J was intending to achieve the same outcome as she believed
would have occurred in Iran, or whether she was seeking to offset
the possible inequity that might have occurred if the husband
refused to issue a talaq. Talaq is a form of unilateral divorce,
available only to the husband. Khula is a consensual divorce that
can be initiated by the wife but which requires the husband’s
consent. The protection of the wife from the economic consequences
of a talaq divorce that is provided by the ‘marriage
portion’ system is not secure in a khula because of the scope
for negotiation over the ‘price’ of the husband’s
consent. Baron J’s order seems to have been aimed to ensure
that the wife maintained her financial rights under a talaq divorce
by providing an incentive for the husband to use that process
rather than force the wife to negotiate a khula. It is uncertain
how far this could also be seen as an indirect mechanism for
enforcing a pre-marital agreement. It should be noted that in
relation to Jewish marriages, a different route is available for
difficulties that arise in cases where one party declines to
arrange a religious divorce after a secular decree has been issued.
The Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 provides for the court
to refuse to make a decree of divorce absolute until steps have
been taken to secure a religious dissolution of the marriage. This
power can be extended to other faiths by statutory instrument, but
this has not yet happened. It is not clear whether this would have
provided a solution in the present case because it would work only
where the husband wished the divorce to go through. If nothing
else, however, the case demonstrates that it is not only in
relation to Jewish marriages that the law needs to be able to take
into account the interaction between secular and religious marital
status.